Far too little provision is made in implementing the preparation and dissemination of information to guide public response to an INE or an RDD, and that should continue to be a priority of our group. Over the ten years in which we have been considering these matters, the preferred option has evolved to be "push technology" that over the next months or years could result in highly specific information residing in the smart phones or other mobile IT devices of much of the populace.
In addressing any question of public health, one must be concerned with different epochs. The most obvious is that which follows not only the analysis but consequent decisions, planning, and deployment; it might be characterized as the "steady state." What would be the consequences for various attacks, and how can they be mitigated?
But long before the steady state, there is the question as to what should be done immediately after the publication of the paper or the delivery of this talk, before societies can be fully prepared to do "the right thing" following an attack. Although the probability of such an event in the first month or year may not be very high, the question must be asked. And we will attempt to describe improvised capabilities for mitigation.
Concentrating first on the improvised nuclear explosion, we note that this has been addressed at the 2010 Planetary Emergencies seminar, in which I drew upon an article that I published that Spring and on a parallel piece by Brooke Buddemeier 1 of LLNL. In turn, this was supplemented by a publication 2 from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which, in particular, provided shielding factors for fallout radiation, for various types of buildings common in the United States.
We can now refer to a much more substantive 120-page DHS document 3 which refers to the National Capital Region (Washington, DC), but which provides methodology and data that could be used for almost any detonation point. Many of my illustrations are taken from that document.
As emphasized much earlier 4 an INE is likely to be of much lower yield than the strategic nuclear weapons now common in the military inventories-which have yields of 100 kt or 500 or even 2000 kt. Instead, an IND is likely to aim for a yield of 10 kt but might achieve only 1 kt or even 0.1 kt. This last is still the blast equivalent of 100 tons of TNT (50 two-ton truck bombs detonated simultaneously at the same point). But with the smaller explosions, and a burst on the surface rather than at altitude, the various damage phenomena differ in relative importance from the strategic weapons. Nuclear explosions cause blast damage by overpressure and high winds; from burns and fire from the large amount of the explosion energy that is radiated from the fireball as heat in a second or less from these low-yield explosions; and from ionizing radiation's impact on people. All of these effects could in principle but not in practice be mitigated by appropriate measures, even if not totally eliminated. Underground buildings are largely immune except in a region of very high blast overpressures, but no one is going to rebuild or build cities of totally different configuration to avoid damage from an INE. The flash burns from the low-yield explosion happen so quickly that little can be done to avoid or reduce them after the fact. Much of the damage from blast comes from broken glass, and tough plastic film on windows can reduce that hazard, as can tough blast curtains that allow light to filter through, but will retain broken window glass.
Where mitigation can really help is in reducing the death toll from the radioactivity instantly produced by the nuclear explosion, but whose dose is delivered over minutes and hours. The explosion is accompanied by an instantaneous flash of neutrons and gamma rays from the fission reaction itself, much of it absorbed by materials of the bomb and attenuated at long distances by air itself. Beyond that, there is the local deposition of radioactive fission products from the bomb, mixed with soil and debris from the ground and buildings vaporized by the explosion. Much of this (perhaps half) falls to earth in the immediate neighborhood of the explosion, even in the region devastated by blast.
Beyond the immediate, local fallout, there is the portion that was lofted into the atmosphere, condensed on fine particles of debris rather than on coarse, and that thus takes longer to deposit from the parcel of air in which the debris finds itself. It falls under the influence of gravity, more slowly the finer the particle.
From the days of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, much is known about the distribution of fallout, and modern atmospheric modeling with fast computer complexes allows the real-time prediction of distribution of fallout and dose to exposed personnel. In similar fashion can be calculated the It has always been recognized that the "open field" values for blast and especially burns and prompt radiation are in reality affected and reduced by the presence of many buildings and structures, and with the increased computing power and sophistication of analysis, the most recent DHS paper reflects these modifications, as shown in its Fig. 9 Thus, as regards prompt radiation, a 10 kt explosion in a city might have the lethal radius of an 8 kt explosion in an open field.
The extent of structural damage to buildings is used to define the SDZ (Severe Damage Zone), the Moderate DZ, and the Light DZ. For a 10-kt ground burst at the intersection of K and 16 th Streets in Washington, the SDZ extends to about 0.5 mile radius, the MDZ to one miles radius, and the LDZ to about three miles.
Although the local explosion phenomena for a 10-kt burst happen within thousandths of a second, the blast propagates at the speed of sound and reaches the 2-3-mile radius in 10-15 seconds. This provides time for some people alerted by the flash from the explosion to take shelter under desks or behind cabinets so that they have less probability of being injured by windows that are likely to shatter under the blast load. Fallout of bomb-produced radioactive material in the immediate area, and from the continued deposition as the radioactive material is moved out of the area by wind, leads to the definition of the Dangerous Fallout Zone (DFZ) and the Hot Zone (HZ). The DFZ is defined by radiation levels of 10 R 5 /hr or greater and is the region in which acute radiation injury or death is possible. In contrast, the HZ is defined by a dose rate of 0.1-10 R/hr and "could extend in numerous directions for hundreds of miles."
Little can be done to mitigate the radiation exposure from the prompt flash of gamma rays and neutrons from the explosion itself, which will give an effective dose to the body that decreases with distance, and in some azimuths is partially blocked by the mass of intervening buildings. But after a second or so, radiation will be dominated by that from bomb-produced fission products attached to coarse debris particles. People outside should get inside as soon as possible and crudely brush the debris from their clothing. Vehicles such as cars, trucks, and buses offer no protection against fallout 6 , and they will all be _09/03/2012_ stopped in any case because of congestion and debris. Once inside, people continue to be exposed to radiation from the fallout on the ground or on ledges or roofs, with the protection factor offered by various types of building construction.
People should move to the regions of their building with higher PF, knowing that the dose rate will decline with time after the explosion. In fact, it has long been approximated that the fission product gamma-ray dose rate 7 decays as T -1.2 , with T the time since the fission explosion. The curve of Fig. 20 illustrates the gamma-ray dose rate. The whole-body dose for which about 50% of those exposed will die within a couple of weeks is about 400 R, and Thus far I have simply recounted the results of a major DHS study, but that has some value in itself, because few of you were probably aware of it. Now let's see what value we can add to that study.
First, to go back to basics, is there much sense on reducing exposure from 500 R to 200 R? How about the risk of cancer even at an exposure of 200 R? Indeed, there is great value in such a reduction. The probability of death at 500 R is on the order of 80%, whereas at 200 R, perhaps only 5% will succumb, although half will be sick. The probability of a lethal cancer is about 1/2000 R, so at the hypothecated 200-R exposure, it would be about 10%. Ten percent residual cancer mortality vs. 75% reduction in prompt lethality is a good payoff-65% of a human life saved-perhaps even more important if it is your own or the life of one of your family members. Furthermore, the death from cancer will not occur for years-perhaps 20 years on the average-a lot of life to be lived from the personal point of view, and invoking a discount rate from the economic or public planning approach.
_09/03/2012_ How realistic is "informed evacuation" and sheltering?
First there is the question as to whether people can be made aware of the considerations of the 2011 "National Capital Region" paper and its summary here. That is involved with the "prepared communication" that gets only a single paragraph in the important DHS report but that has been treated at considerable length in the PMP-MTA papers. We propose not only the identification of people who deserve and indeed possess public trust (if any remain in the fractured American society) but also the dissemination of appropriate instructions and graphics that would reside on many, many home and office PCs and smart phones. Thus, even in the Moderate Damage Zone and heavy fallout areas a good fraction of the people could look up emergency summaries and graphics already resident on the smartphone to help guide their actions in the minutes following an INE. How can we make this happen? In the United States, it will happen only if some contractor or consortium provides such a tool, either on speculation or in response to a solicitation and contract award from the federal government. This is not necessarily a long process, given fast-action elements of the U.S. government such as DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and its younger sibling in the Department of Energy-ARPA-E.
But in the age of globalization, and in countries that have not yet been reached by the tsunami of privatization, this eminently governmental obligation and opportunity might be done within a government organization.
At this point one might have a short excursion as to why the contracting approach is faster than the in-house approach. Primarily it is because of the difficulty in diverting people from whatever they are doing to something that the management (occasionally leadership) of the organization decides they should do. satisfied to appear to be doing nothing. It is bad for the soul and worse for the funding of the organization. You can write the rest of the story.
Even if there is a high probability of an urban INE somewhere, there is a low probability in any particular city. Therefore, whatever the merit of centrally-developed substance and communication, there is much less merit to its independent formulation in every potential target. Overall, if one assumes a 10% likelihood per year of an urban INE someplace, and considers that appropriate planning might save 100,000 people who would otherwise be killed by radiation from fallout, this would surely be an expenditure well justified on a world scale, even repeated several times in a competitive effort to produce a system that is considerably better than the uninformed response. Of course, many millions of people are at risk from disease and poverty, and that a few million dollars in rational thought and allocation of resources could save them, and that should be done, too. Here we are talking about people who have more or less functioning governments that are partially responsive to their demands and to rational thought. Dose Thresholds for Evacuation Following Explosion of an Improvised Nuclear Device or Radiological Dispersal Device Richard L. Garwin
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Although the November 2011 DHS paper is a major advance over previous analyses, it does not do much in the way of sensitivity analysis. That is, how accurate are the projections in the paper? And to what extent would knowledge of the local meteorology (winds and rain) reflect reality in the projections? It is a great achievement that the excellent center at LLNL "NARAC" is able in real time to predict fallout, given only the magnitude and location of the IND detonation, but how accurate is that projection?
First, of course, it would be desirable to provide a proper input (explosive yield), and that is surely a government function that might be achieved from seismometers or from local barographs installed for the purpose. Location is readily and quickly determined seismically. Yield would then be determined by the low-frequency pressure pulse ("step") derived from the barograph. There is also a strong incentive to measure directly the fallout, in order to guide evacuation that might take place after a few hours or tens of hours. This could be done in a progressive manner, first with a Dose Thresholds for Evacuation Following Explosion of an Improvised Nuclear Device or Radiological Dispersal Device Richard L. Garwin 25 low-resolution, less accurate fallout app or database, and later with increasing accuracy to guide evacuation routes and longer term planning.
As was recommended in my 2011 Erice paper 8 , it would be feasible and desirable to have a small system of 10-kg drone aircraft, self-navigating via GPS, that would via data link provide a quantitative map of ground contamination of fission products. A single such vehicle flying at 50 km/hr could in 5 hours map a 15 km by 15 km square from an altitude of 0.5 km, with a resolution of about 0.3 km. Proportionally more quickly with more drones in operation. This would be enough to identify the broad patterns of ground contamination but not enough to provide a detailed map to help guide the sequence of evacuation.
That could be achieved sooner by a vehicle that would fly at an altitude of about 200 m, along potential evacuation routes, providing a ground resolution on the order of 50 m, to determine the likely exposure and the regions where it is important not to loiter.
EVACUATION IN RESPONSE TO AN RDD ATTACK?
Evacuation thresholds following use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) as previous papers for and of the PMP-MTA have shown, the impact of contamination from an RDD can be large, even though the number of expected fatalities is small. That impact can be mitigated by appropriate analysis and communication strategy, including responsive monitoring of the environment following the RDD. Because industrial and commercial (including medical) sources of intense radiation all have lifetimes of years, there is far less urgency for evacuation or in fact any action following the dispersal of radioactivity than is the case with fallout from a nuclear explosion. For specificity, we take the illustration of Fig. 2 .
